Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to Children by Garnett, Richard W.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 76 | Issue 1 Article 3
11-1-2000
Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious
Education, and Harm to Children
Richard W. Garnett
University of Notre Dame, rgarnett@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to Children, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 87 (2000).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol76/iss1/3
SYMPOSIUM
TAKING PIERCE SERIOUSLY: THE FAMILY,
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, AND HARM
TO CHILDREN
Richard W. Garnett*
Most people believe in the power of prayer, and many try to ori-
ent and direct their lives in accord with this and other religious be-
liefs.' To many scholars and theorists, this persistence of faith and
piety is a bit mysterious; to some, it is even cause for concern.2 True,
many of those who pray likely think of what they are doing in New
Age, psycho-oncological, therapeutic, "power of positive thinking"
terms and so are less worrisome.3 For many others, though, prayer is
more than "having a good thought" about something or participating
* Assistant Professor, Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Indiana. J.D., Yale
Law School, 1995; BA., Duke University, 1990. This Article is (loosely) based on a
talk given onJanuary 9, 2000 at the Joint Program of the Sections on Law, Religion &
Family and Juvenile Law during the Annual Meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools in Washington, D.C. I am grateful to Fred Marczyk for his help and
advice with this and other projects; to the Notre Dame Law School for research
assistance; to A.J. Bellia, Paolo Carozza, Nicole Garnett, Steffen Johnson, William
Kelley, John Nagle, David Petron, Charles Rice, Horard Sklamberg, Steven Smith,
and Eric Treene for their comments and criticism; and to the editors and staff of the
Notre Dame Law Review for their patience. This Article is dedicated, warts and all, to
my teacher and friend,Joseph Goldstein, who died this past year. The author can be
contacted at rick.garnett.4@nd.edu.
1 Se, eg., David Whitman, Afore Moral THE NEw RFPUC, Feb. 22, 1999, at 18,
18 (citing a 1997 Gallup Poll showing that ninety percent of Americans pray).
2 As Michael Paulsen has noted, many in the academy "believe that religious
faith is crazy (or... put more gently, 'irrational') and its adherents are the functional
equivalent of lunatics." Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Grea4 Garvy Is Good: Making
Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NoTRa DAsm L. Rnv. 1597, 1613 (1997) (book review); see,
eg., Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEo. UJ. 453 (1996).
3 SeeJames G. Dwyer, Spiritual Treatment Exemptions to Child Medical Neglect Laws:
What We Outsiders Should Think 76 NoTRE DAmE L Rav. 147, 149 (2000) (discussing
"the usefulness of positive thinking,. . . the ability of the mind to support ph)sical
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in a moment of warm or hopeful feeling at the invitation of a politi-
cian. It is, instead, a mysterious, yet miraculously efficacious, form of
participation in and cooperation with God's creative activity, His prov-
idence, and "His plan of love for men."4 Indeed, for many, prayer is
not optional; they regard themselves as called-as commanded-to pray
"in everything"5 and "without ceasing."
6
Moreover, many people believe that prayer is a perfectly appro-
priate response to physical illness, pain, and injury.7 They have no
problem with medical science, hospitals, drugs, and doctors, but they
also believe that God hears and answers prayers. They know that He
cures the sick, comforts the suffering, and heals the injured. To para-
phrase the old saying, these believers pray as if everything depends on
God, but are quite willing to act as if everything depends on medicine.
For still others-Christian Scientists, for example-prayer is, in
times of sickness, not only appropriate, it is the response required by
their faith.8 Those under such religious obligations often refuse con-
ventional and even emergency medical treatment for themselves
and-more controversially.for their children. But for their religious
motivation, these refusals could be viewed as culpably negligent, as
abusive, or perhaps even as criminal. 9
responses to disease and injury, and. . . the possibility of using prayer and religious
teaching as one form of such positive thinking").
4 U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOUC CHURCH §§ 2565,
2738 (2000) (relating prayer to "the living relationship of the children of God with
their Father who is good beyond measure" and to our "cooperation with [God's]
providence [and] his plan of love for men"); see id. § 2568 ("Prayer is bound up with
human history, for it is the relationship with God in historical events.").
5 Philippians 4:6 ("Do not be anxious about anything, but in everything, by
prayer and petition, with thanksgiving, present your requests to God.").
6 1 Thessalonians 5:16-18 ("Rejoice always, pray without ceasing, give thanks in
all circumstances; for this is the will of God in ChristJesus for you.").
7 See, e.g., James 5:15-16 ("And the prayer offered in faith will make the sick per-
son well; the Lord will raise him up .... Therefore confess your sins to each other
and pray for each other so that you may be healed. The prayer of a righteous man is
powerful and effective.").
8 See, e.g., Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d
1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that Christian Scientists "object to medical care
and embrace prayer as the sole means of healing"). See generally MARY BAKER EDDY,
SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY To THE Sc~iu-ruaEs (First Church of Christ, Scientist
1994) (1875). For a discussion of other religious groups that opt for spiritual healing
over medical treatment, see, for example, Jennifer L. Hartsell, Comment, Mother May
I... Live? Parental Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment for Children Based on
Religious Objections, 66 TEN. L. REv. 499, 503-06 (1999).
9 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (affirming man-




Most states, however, exempt religious parents from prosecution,
or limit their exposure to criminal liability, when their failure to seek
medical care for their sick or injured children is motivated by relig-
ious belief.'0 These spiritual-healing exemptions are both common
and controversial, and they raise important questions, including: How
ought we to reconcile what sometimes appear to be the competing
demands of a Constitution that protects religious liberty and family
integrity by disabling government," our moral commitments to the
full personhood and equal dignity of children,12 and a parens patriae
tradition in which the health and welfare of children are thought to
be the proper objects of government concern and activity?' 3
Although the topic for this symposium is "Children, Spiritual
Healing, and Religious Exercise," I am not going to discuss whether
spiritual-healing exemptions from otherwise generally applicable
child-welfare and criminal laws are constitutional, sensible, or morally
justifiable.' 4 Instead, I will ask what, if anything, the debate about
10 On spiritual-treatment exemptions generally, see James G. Dwyer, The Children
We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child I11lfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal
Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1321 (1996); Eric W. Treene,
Prayer-Treatment Exemptions to Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes, Mlanslaughter Proseutions,
and Due Process of Law, 30 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 135 (1993).
11 This is precisely why the Framers disabled-or refused to enable-the federal
government. See, e.g., United +States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
12 See, eg., POPEJOHN PAUL I, TiE APosTOLIC EXHORTATION ON THE ROLE OF THE
GmusrsA FAuLY IN THE MODERN NORLD [Familiaris consortio] No. 26 (St. Paul Edi-
dons 1981) ("[S]pecial attention must be devoted to the children by developing a
profound esteem for their personal dignity, and a great respect and generous con-
cem for their rights."); James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Wedfare: De-
bunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L REv. 1371, 1446 (1994) ("[The child
is... not the mere creature of the parent... [but is rather] his or her oin person.").
13 Parens patia--"parent of the country"-is the "principle that the state must
care for those who cannot take care of themselves." BLCK'S Lxw Diarto,.,,w 1114
(6th ed. 1990). As one court has observed, "[I]t is well-settled that the State as parens
patriae has a special duty to protect minors and, if necessary, make vital decisions as to
whether to submit a minor to necessary treatment where the condition is life threat-
ening, as wrenching and distasteful as such actions may be." In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d
322, 327 (IlM. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Se generally
Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L
REv. 205 (1971).
14 I believe that spiritual-treatment exemptions can be crafted to be both constitu-
tional and morallyjustified and that such exemptions are not inconsistent with court-
ordered medical care over parents' religion-based objections when such care is likely
to succeed and is clearly necessary to avoid death or serious physical harm to a young
child. SeeJos;E'H GOLDsrEN zr Al, THE Bs INTERErS OF THE CHuLD: THE LEAsT
DETRmRiENAL ALT xrrvE 128-38 (1996) (discussing situations where court-ordered
medical care over parents' objections is appropriate).
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these exemptions says about the State's authority to override parents'
decisions about education, particularly religious education.', What
can the questions surrounding spiritual-treatment exemptions tell us
about who should decide what, where, for what purpose, and from
whom children will learn? If we accept, for example, that the State
may in some cases require medical treatment for a child, over her
parents' objections, to avoid serious injury or death, should it follow
that it may regulate, or even forbid, a child's religious training or re-
ligious-school education to prevent an analogous, though perhaps
less tangible, "harm"? What is the extent of the Government's power
to interfere-whether to protect children's "temporal well-being,"16 to
inculcate majoritarian values, or to "bolster the preconditions of lib-
eral democracy"' 7-with parents' education-related decisions and, in
particular, with their decisions to provide religious training to their
children and to send them to authentically religious schools?'8 The
Supreme Court has said, over and again, in a long line of cases from
Pierce v. Society of Sisters19 to last summer's Troxel v. Granville,20 that par-
ents enjoy a "fundamental" right to direct and control the education
of their children, but do we really accept, or even understand,
the premises, foundations, and implications of these repeated
pronouncements? 21
15 My fellow contributor, ProfessorJames Dwyer, has highlighted the connection
between the medical-treatment and education issues. SeeJAMFS G. DwvE, REULIOUS
ScHooLs v. CHILDREN's RIGHTS (1998); Dwyer, supra note 3, at 168-70, 172-73; Dwyer,
supra note 10, at 1329-53.
16 Dwyer, supra note 10, at 1407 ("The state itself must determine what children's
fundamental interests are and, in doing so, may only consider children's temporal
well-being.").
17 William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: Three
Sources of Liberal Theoy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 869, 869 (1999).
18 By "authentically" religious schools, I mean simply schools whose religiosity
goes beyond mere institutional affiliation or historical tradition, schools whose "over-
riding religious mission... permeates their teaching," Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct.
2530, 2582 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting), schools that the Supreme Court has until
recently too often branded disapprovingly as "pervasively sectarian," id. at 2552 (plu-
rality opinion) (rejecting the Court's "pervasively sectarian" test as a doctrine "born of
bigotry").
19 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
20 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000).
21 Some think the Court has yet to come up with a good theory to explain Its
holding in Pierce and to make it cohere with the autonomy-centered individualism
that seems generally to animate its constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). As a result, parents' educational rights
"are both ill defined and vulnerable to unduly deferential judicial review of state edu-
cational regulation." Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto,
63 U. CHi. L. REv. 937, 938 (1996).
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Now, it has been argued powerfully that parents in a liberal state
do not and should not have a "right" to control their children's educa-
tion-after all, it is said, no one has a ight to control anyone.2 Chil-
dren are not slaves; they are no one's property.2 It follows, then, that
decisions about children's education should, like all child-related de-
cisions, be "child centered"; they should be guided entirely by chil-
dren's interests, as determined by the State, and not by appeals to the
liberties, rights, interests, or preferences of parents. 2 4 But again, the
Supreme Court said in Perce, and still purports to believe,25 that our
Constitution guarantees the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children."26 Can this statement be
defended?
I think so. 27 I certainly hope so. Recent calls for a "thicker" liber-
alism and for the harnessing of education to create truly liberal citi-
zens make it all the more important that we take Pierce seriously. And
22 See, eg., Dwyer, supra note 12, at 1405 ("(A]s a general rule, our legal system
does not recognize or bestow on individuals rights to control the lives of other per-
sons."). But see Stephen G. Gilles, H, Christians, Leave Your K'ds Alone!, 16 Co.-sr.
COmnTr. 149, 187-90 (1999) (arguing that there is nothing "anomalous" about per-
mitting parents, rather than the State, to balance children's spiritual and temporal
interests).
23 See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "MWo Owns the Child?" Meyer and Pierce
and the Child as Propery, 33 Wri. & M4ARY L. REv 995 (1992).
24 See, eg., Dwyer, supra note 3, at 160-61; Dwyer, supra note 12, at 1374 ("1 pro-
pose that children's rights, rather than parents' rights, be the legal basis for protect-
ing the interests of children."). Then again, many who endorse parental control do
so precisely because they think it well serves the best interests of children. See, e.g.,
Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (noting that the concept of the "family as a
unit with broad parental authority over minor children" is rooted in the recognition
that the "natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children"); Gilles, supra note 22, at 951 n.53 (1996) ("The human flourishing of adult
parents, which is highly bound up with the education of their children, matters too, as
does society's interest in good citizens. Nonetheless, no justification is persuasive if it
fails to give great weight to the child's best interest.").
25 See Troxel 120 S. Ct. at 2060 (plurality opinion) ("[1]t cannot now be doubted
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental
-right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children."); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("[T]he 'liberty' spe-
cially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right.., to direct the educa-
tion and upbringing of one's children ....").
26 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
27 See Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Rdigion, and Sdiools: Reflctions on Pierce, 70 Years
Later, 27 SzroN HALL L. REv. 1194, 1195 (1997) ("1 want to speculate.., on the
possibility that Pierce is both rightly decided and rightly reasoned, and thus that par-
ents really do possess a fundamental constitutional right to direct die upbringing of
their children."). See generally, eg., Stephen G. Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Children's
Educational Rights, 26 CAP. U. L. REv. 9 (1997); Gilles, supra note 22.
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so, I will try to outline some reasons why it does make sense to talk in
Pierce-like terms, not only about parental control over education, but
also about the intrinsic dignity of the family-the "first and vital cell of
society"28 -and its role in civil society. Given the nature and format of
this symposium, my suggestions and thoughts on these matters are
unavoidably preliminary. I will not be able in this Article to flesh out
completely my okn,) arguments or to respond fully to other and oppos-
ing views. Still, I will suggest that, if we do resolve to take Pierce seri-
ously, we should then say that state functionaries, guided and
restrained by a proper humility about their authority and compe-
tence, should meddle with parents' educational decisions only to pre-
vent harm, very carefully defined, to a child. That is, they should not
intervene simply whenever they think intrusion or oversight would
serve the Government's notion of the child's "best interests" or its own
perceived need and claimed prerogative to create a certain kind of
citizen.2
9
The problem is, how do we define "harm." We have a good idea
what physical abuse and medical neglect look like, but when are par-
ents' educational decisions, and particularly their decisions about re-
ligious training, "harmful"? This is a difficult question, but I will
propose, as a start, that the content of religious instruction, traditions,
or beliefs should not be viewed as harmful in the sense necessary to
justify government second-guessing or "supervention"30 of parents' de-
cisions about such instruction. In a free society, one that values relig-
ious freedom, the State should not entertain, let alone enforce, a
belief that children would be better off without religious faith.
II. THE QUESTION PRESENTED-WHY WE OUTSIDERS AGREE
Almost every state exempts religious parents who opt for prayer
over medical treatment for their children from criminal prosecution
28 POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 12, No. 42, at 67 (quoting SECOND VATICAN
ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECREE ON THE APOSTOLATE OF THE LArrY [Apostolicam actuosi-
tatem] No. 11 (1965)).
29 In my view, government "intervention" in the family is intervention, But see
Dwyer, supra note 3, at 167 ("[T]he reality is that the family is not a separate, primor-
dial sphere that is or can be cordoned off from the power of the state. Quite the
opposite. The law creates the family, and things could not be othenvise."); Frances E.
Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REroRMu 835, 838
(1985). But this is not "the reality." The law no more "creates" the family than the
Rule Against Perpetuities "creates" dirt.
30 Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Paren-
tal Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 647 (1977).
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and from liability under neglect, abuse, and endangerment laws.3 1
These exemptions, and the conflict between religious views and chil-
dren's healthcare generally, have been examined thoroughly in the
law reviews,32 the courts,33 and the public square?"4 And it is safe to
say, as my co-panelist ProfessorJames Dwyer observes, that we "outsid-
ers"-"we who are not members of a religious group with beliefs op-
posed to medical care and who therefore have no personal stake in
the issue"-35-disagree among ourselves about the wisdom, constitu-
tionality, and morality of such exemptions. Some take the position
that exemptions reflect attempts to balance free-exercise values and
the State's interest in protecting children, that it is appropriate to bal-
ance these interests, and that while blanket exemptions might reflect
excessive deference to the religious beliefs of parents, some limitation
31 See Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 776-77 n.1 (Fla. 1992) (listing stat-
utes); Hartsell, supra note 8, at 509-10.
32 See generaly, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 10; Ann MacLean Massie, The Religion
Clauses and Parental Healthcare Dedsionmaking for Children: Suggestions for a Ne Ap-
proach, 21 HAsTIcNs CONST. L.Q. 725 (1994); Rita Swan, On StatutesDeprvinga Class of
Children of Rights to Medical Care Can This Discrimination Be Litigated?, 2 QUINxIPzAc
HEALTH Lj. 73 (1998); LaDonna DiCamillo, Comment, Caught Betcen the Clauses and
the Branches: When Parents Deny Their Child Non-emergency Medical Treatment for Religious
Reasons, 19 J. Juy. L. 123 (1998); Hartsell, supra note 8; Anne D. Lederman, Note,
Understanding Faith. When Religious Parents Decline Conventional Aedical Treatment for
Their Children, 45 CASE W. Rxs. L. REv. 891 (1995).
33 See e.g., Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d
1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 2000); Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570, 571 (Colo. 1991);
Hermanson, 604 So. 2d at 776; Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 612 (Mass.
1993); State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Minn. 1991); State v. Hays, 964 P.2d
1042, 1044 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Commonwealth v. Nixon, 718 A.2d 311, 312 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998).
34 See, e.g., Ellen Barry & Elisa Crouch, Probe Asks if Faith Put Children at Ris7 Bos-
TON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 1999, at B1; Mark Larabee, Balancing Rights Maes Faith.Healing
Bills Thony, PORTLA D OREGONIAN, June 28, 1999, at E8; Mark Larabee, Christian
Scientists Promote Legal Shieds forFaith Henars, CLEVELAND PLAIN Du.mLR,Jan. 9, 1999, at
3F; Nancy Lofholm, A Matter ofFaith, Justice: Is Withholding Care a Crime?, D&%ER, PosT,
Mar. 15, 1999, at Al; Patricia G. Miller, Parents Hold Major Role in Minors' Decisions,
PrITSBuRGH Posr-GAz= , Apr. 20, 2000, at B2. For more information on religion-
based exemptions from neglect and abuse statutes, from an advocacy group that op-
poses such exemptions, see http://w.childrenshealthcare.org/legal.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 31, 2000).
35 Dwyer, supra note 3, at 148. I disagree with the claim that those of uts "outsid-
ers" who are not required by our faith to rely solely on spiritual healing therefore
"have no personal stake" in questions about spiritual-healing exemptions. The ex-
emptions debate implicates broader questions about religious freedom, family integ-
rity, and parental control, questions in whose correct resolution a great many
"outsiders" have a significant "stake."
2000]
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on exposure to criminal liability is probably appropriate.36 Others in-
sist, though, that any appropriate balancing of interests must weigh
heavily against spiritual-healing exemptions, or that it is simply wrong
to "balance" children's health against parents' faith.3 7 Professor
Dwyer, for example, objects to exemptions because they privilege the
religious views and interests of parents over the Government's view of
children's temporal interests.3 8 Although "extremely limited" exemp-
tions might be justified by reasons "tied to the interests of the children
of insiders, as the State sees them" and by "general principles regard-
ing treatment of individuals in light of their personhood," the sweep-
ing provisions that exist in many states are, he thinks,
unconstitutional, illiberal, and-put bluntly-"immoral."3 9
I am not entirely sure how we should strike the balance between
parents' religion-based preferences for prayer over doctors' and the
Government's interest in protecting the physical well-being of chil-
36 See, e.g., DiCamillo, supra note 32, at 124; Hartsell, supra note 8, at 528-30;
Lederman, supra note 32, at 894-95. Professor David Steinberg, for example, offers
such a moderate view. He recognizes both the First Amendment right of religious
parents to follow the dictates of their faith when treating a child's illness and the
State's interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens, particularly chil-
dren, who, he observes, cannot care for themselves. Given these competing values, he
concludes that the Government may require parents to obtain medical care, and pun-
ish them for not obtaining such care, only when the failure to seek treatment poses a
serious threat of permanent harm to a child's health. See David E. Steinberg, Children
and Spiritual Healing. Having Faith in Free Exercise, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179, 207
(2000).
37 See, e.g., Janna C. Merrick, Christian Science Healing of Minor Children: Spiritual
Exemption Statutes, First Amendment Rights, and Fair Notice, 10 IssuES L. & MEr. 321, 341
(1994); Jennifer L. Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due Process
and the Effect of Faith Healing Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29
U.S.F. L. REV. 43, 116 (1994); Elizabeth A. Lingle, Comment, Treating Children by Faith:
Colliding Constitutional Issues, 17J. LEGAL MED. 301, 329 (1996).
38 See Dwyer, supra note 3, at 166-68. Professor Dwyer has developed his "child
centered" approach to child rearing, his arguments against Pierce-style notions of par-
ents' rights, and his criticisms of religious education in a number of books and art.
cles, including DwYER, supra note 15; James G. Dwyer, Children's Interests in a Family
Context-A Cautionary Note, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1053 (1999); Dwyer, supra note 10;
Dwyer, supra note 12.
39 Dwyer, supra note 3, at 166. The latter charge-that spiritual-treatment ex-
emptions are "immoral to the extent they cannot be justified in terms of what is best,
from the state's perspective, for the children whose welfare is at stake'-seems too
harsh, at least with respect to exemptions from criminal prosecution. Even accepting
child-centered premises-that is, that children's interests, not parents' wishes, control
and that the State's views about children's temporal best interests are privileged-we
might morally still refuse to treat a religious parent's state of mind as sufficiently
blameworthy to merit criminal punishment.
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dren.4° It should be noted that, exemptions from prosecution aside,
courts often order medical treatment for children, on a case-by-case
basis, even over those children's parents' religion-based objections.
These orders implicate First Amendment and religious-freedom -al-
ues, but I think most of us would agree that they can be, if done right,
consistent with a proper respect for parental prerogatives, religious
freedom, and limited government.41
This is because we generally agree-insiders and outsiders with
each other, and outsiders among themselves-that the "harm" to the
40 A careful examination of the constitutionality of spiritual-treatment exemp-
tions and a response to the claim that they violate the Establishment Clause because
they privilege the religious beliefs of "insiders" are beyond the scope of this Article.
See Dwyer, supra note 3, at 152 ("[S]upporters of exemptions cannot appeal to relig-
ions beliefs, since the State may not assume that any particular religious beliefs are
true.... [A]ilso ... [they] cannot expect the State itself to adopt the insiders' perspec-
tive, insofar as it is based on religious beliefs."). Assuming, though, that exemptions
are denomination-neutral, see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-47 (1982), why
should they be regarded as anything other than run-of-the-mill "accommodations" of
religion? See generally Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212
F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding certain Medicare-related exemptions for Chris-
tian Science facilities); Treene, supra note 10, at 160-64 (analyzing spiritual-healing
exemptions in light of the Establishment Clause). The First Amendment permits the
Government to pursue the valid secular purpose of accommodating religious belief
and practice. See, eg., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 827, 335
(1987); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("Nor does the Constitution
require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommo-
dation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."); Zo-
rach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (rejecting argument that "public
institutions can make no adjustments ... to accommodate the religious needs of the
people"). See generay William K. Kelley, Tire Primacy of Political Adors in Accommodation
of Religion, 22 U. HAw. L. REv. (forthcoming 2000); Michael W. McConnell, Accommo-
dation of Religion: An Update and a Response to tw Critics, 60 CEO. WMsn. L REx. 685,
695-96 (1992). The claim that exemptions are unconstitutional because they take
account of religious belief, recognize that insiders have religious interests, or respond
to those beliefs by lifting a government-imposed burden is simply wvrong. All accom-
modations take account of religious beliefs. That is why they exist. It is not true that
government may only accommodate religion by accident. Seq, eg., Amos. 483 U.S. at
338 ("[This Court] has never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to
religious groups are per se invalid. That would run contrary to the teaching of our
cases that there is ample room for accommodation of religion under the Establish-
ment Clause.").
41 But see Dwyer, supra note 3, at 166.
Curiously, though, most proponents of this sort of "spheres of authority"
position allow for state control over child rearing at the margins. The State
- may step in to prevent death. But they provide no real explanation for this
qualification of the separate spheres position, for ceding some authority to
the State.
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child that is used to justify supervention of parents' religion-based
health-care decisions really is a harm. We know what physical or medi-
cal harm looks like. And, whoever we think is the best decision-maker
when it comes to children's health-care, and whether or not we think
the religious beliefs of parents and children may be considered by
that decision-maker, and whatever our general views about the com-
peting claims of religious believers and governments, none of us wants
a child to die or to suffer serious physical harm. Certainly, few spiri-
tual-healing believers are oblivious of or indifferent to their children's
temporal well-being.42 They simply believe that prayer, religious faith,
and spiritual-healing practices are more likely to avert that harm, and
to do so via more acceptable (to them, and to God) means, than is
medical treatment.
This helps to explain why outsiders who disagree strongly about
the power of the State and the child-rearing rights of parents actually
agree as much as they do about the propriety of court-ordered emer-
gency medical treatment. It is not because parents' moral claims
evaporate in the health-care context, but rather because, first, no one
thinks these claims include an entitlement to do or cause real harm to
a child; second, we all agree that death or physical injury is a real harm;
and third, we are less worried, because of this agreement, than we
might be in other contested contexts about the dangers of statist sec-
ond-guessing.
Can this point of consensus be put to any use in the education
debate? Again, the Court tells us that part of the "liberty" protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment is parents' "fundamental" right to di-
rect their children's education 43 and, in particular, given the First
Amendment's religious-freedom guarantee, to control their children's
religious training.44 Still, the debate goes on. On one side, there are
those who contend that the State has the duty and right to regulate
children's education, to decide what they must and should not be
42 Cf. Dwyer, supra note 3, at 150 ("I doubt that members of the Church of Christ
Scientist watch their children suffer and die with equanimity, and the children them-
selves might be terrified, in addition to suffering physical pain.").
43 See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("In
light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.").
44 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229 (1972). Indeed, the Court in Yodcr
seemed to think that only those educational decisions that are rooted in religious
belief enjoy the protection afforded "fundamental" rights. See id. at 215-16; see also
Steven D. Smith, Wisconsin v. Yoder and the Unprincipled Approach to Religious Freedom,
25 CAP. U. L. REV. 805, 807 (1996).
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taught in schools,5 and to do so solely on the basis of its own assess-
ment of the child's best interests. On the other side are those who
maintain that parents are not only entitled but obligated to make
these decisions, based on their own assessments of the competing val-
ues, informed perhaps by their faith, subject to state second-guessing
only to prevent clear harm to a child.
So far, it looks like the education debate maps fairly closely onto
the health-care debate, and it appears that there is agreement at least
on the point that the State mayjustifiably override parents' education-
related decisions to prevent "harm" to a child. But when, if ever, is
education "harmful"? What about religious education and instruction?
Again, in the health-care context, notwithstanding important dis-
agreements, we agree, by and large, that the State may override par-
ents' wishes in order to prevent harm, that physical injury or death is a
harm, and that the purpose of medical care is to avoid such harm.
But when it comes to government regulation of education, the disa-
greement between statists and "parentalists" 46 turns not only on the
rights/privileges distinction, the scope of the State's parens palriae and
police powers, and the relevance of religion to decision-makers' calcu-
45 Less common, I think, is the bolder claim that the parenspatriae pover of the
liberal state permits or requires it to regulate what is "taught" to children outside
school-say, at the dinner table. See, e.g., Dwmv., supra note 15, at 158 ("[P]arents...
may be required to give up some measure of their personal liberty as a condition for
enjoying the privilege of participating in the children's upbringing.... For example,
they might justifiably be proscribed from expressing sexist views in the presence of
children in a way that damages children's self-esteem. .. ."). This is a remarkable-
and, to many, repellent-assertion. Sce e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 632
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)..
In The Republic and in Tie Laws, Plato offered a vision of a unified society,
where the needs of children are met not by parents but by the government,
and where no intermediate forms of association stand between the individ-
ual and the state. The vision is a brilliant one, but it is not our own.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Then again, if the State is authorized, and
perhaps obligated, to look after the best temporal interests of children as it sees them,
and if parents' authority to direct and control their children's education is more in
the nature of a privilege than a right, and if the liberal state believes that it is not in
the best interests of children to be taught certain views, opinions, and beliefs, then I
am not sure what principled basis there is for liberal statists to assure us that the
dinner table, car pool, and bedtime story, unlike the traditional school day, are teach-
ing moments beyond the State's power. As Rousseau once recommended, the "newly-
born infant, upon first opening his eyes, must gaze upon tie fatherland, and until his
dying day should behold nothing else." J. Roussu, THE Go%,'erv.r-r OF PotiND 21
(W. Kendall trans., 1972), quoted in Cass P. Sunstein, Belond the Republican Revhal, 97
YALE LJ. 1539, 1572 (1988).
46 See generally Gilles, supra note 27, at 11 (defending "liberal parentalism").
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lations, but also on the basic problem of identifying "harm. '47 If the
State may, in some cases, require medical treatment to prevent serious
physical harm, may it also protect children from the "harm" of being
taught, for example, that Genesis is true, that extra-marital sexual ac-
tivity is a sin, or that unbelievers are damned? Are such teachings
harmful? Some say "yes"; many say "no." But it is precisely this kind of
inevitable and intractable disagreement that makes it all the more im-
portant to examine carefully, and to cabin closely, the Government's
asserted authority to second-guess parents and supervise their educa-
tional choices.
III. TAKING PIERCE SERIOUSLY
Here, one might object: "You say that the Government must stay
its hand, because 'harm' is hard to define when it comes to education.
So what if it is? Your standard is too demanding, and it is inconsistent
with the importance of education to the public good and with the
State's parens patriae obligations. It is enough if the experts decide
that a particular course of study is or is not, all (non-religious) things
considered, in the best interests of children and the community." No,
it is not-not if we take Pierce seriously.
We have probably all heard the story about Benjamin Franklin
being asked by a Philadelphia woman during the Constitutional Con-
vention, '"ell, Doctor, what have we got?," and responding, "A repub-
lic, if you can keep it."148 I suspect that many political theorists wish
that a colonial Chris Matthews or Tim Russert had been there to ask
the now-obvious follow-up question, "And how exactly do we keep it?"
Today, some argue that one of the things we have to do to "keep"
our republic (or, our liberal democracy) is to quite self-consciously
create-specifically, to educate-republicans (or, liberal demo-
crats).49 After all, citizens capable of self-government do not just hap-
pen; "[L]iberal democratic citizens are made, not born ..... &0 As
George Will puts it, statecraft, properly understood, is soulcraft:
"[M] en and women are biological facts, but.., ladies and gentlemen
47 See Dwyer, supra note 3, at 150-51 (listing reasons for disagreement),
48 See 3 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 85 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966).
49 Cf. Galston, supra note 17, at 872 ("Within the civic republican tradition, state
intrusion to foster good citizens poses no threshold issues; not so for liberal democ-
racy, whose core commitments place limits on the measures the state legitimately may
employ."). The lines between today's "neo-republicans," "republican revivalists," and
civil-society liberals are often hard to identify, and I will not try to find them here.
50 Galston, supra note 17, at 870.
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fit for self-government are social artifacts, creations of the law."51 And
so, Amy Gutmann argues, "conscious social reproduction"---citizen
creation-is both a "core value" of, and a requirement for, "delibera-
tive democracy."52 Even liberal societies, if they hope to thrive and
survive, must inculcate values and promote "contested views of the
good"; they must orient their governments and citizen-shaping
processes in a way likely to produce agreement on those views.5 3 A
society that aspires to meaningful democracy, the argument goes,
must take care that it makes-again, that it educatea--citizens capable
of valuing and achieving that end.
54
In other words, it looks like the emerging consensus in political
theory is that the poet, William Ross Wallace, was right (as uas the
creepy movie): The hand that rocks the cradle rules the world. In
other words, those who decide what children may and should learn
thereby shape, if not determine, those children's character and com-
mitments, as well as those of the community.5r This is why many polit-
ical theorists have answered the "who should decide" question by
"subordinating the authority of individual parents to overriding con-
ceptions of liberal democratic values or to the decisions of political
majorities." 56 This is why leading liberal statists57 like Gutmann and,
more recently, Stephen Macedo insist candidly that "public schools
51 GEORGE F. WIu.L, STATECRAFT AS SouLcRAFr. WHAT GoERN MENr DoEs 90-91
(1983).
52 Amy GuMANN, DuiocRAnc EDuQ.%TION 39, 42 (1987) ("We are committed to
collectively re-creating the society that we share .... The substance of this core
commitment is conscious social reproduction.").
53 Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAN. L REv. 1, 2 (2000).
54 See GuTiANN, supra note 52, at 39 ("[A] society that supports conscious social
reproduction must educate all educable children to be capable of participating in
collectively shaping their society.").
55 See Scott W. Somerville, Education Reform at the Crossroads: The Histoiy and Politics
of School Choice 10 GEO. MASON U. Crv. RTs. UJ. 121, 123 (1999/2000) ("It slowly
dawned on me that schools are the most powerful possible instruments for gaining
long-term control over a democracy.").
56 Gilles, supra note 22, at 937.
57 "Liberal statism" is, for present purposes, the view that the needs of liberal
democracy and the demands of liberal citizenship authorize or require the State to
supervise, regulate, and dictate the content of education. Se Stephen L Carter, RMig-
is Freedom as fRigion Matter. A Tribute toJusticeBrennan, 87 Cu.. L RE% 1059, 1065
(1999) ("When I say statism,. . . I have in mind a sense of the state's rightness, or
goodness-an empirical belief that the state is less likely than the individual to make a
moral error. Since the Enlightenment, the entire liberal political project has rested
on this idea."); Dwyer, supra note 3, at 172-73 (rejecting "liberal statis m]" and insist-
ing that "only children themselves have any moral claim or entitlement in connection
with their upbringing"); Gilles, supra note 27, at 10 ("The main alternative to liberal
parentalism is what I call liberal statism-the view that parental educational authority
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are instruments for the most basic and controversial of civic ends," the
"project of forming citizens .... ."15 And this is why, more than seventy-
five years ago, Oregon voters enacted by initiative the Compulsory Ed-
ucation Act, making it a crime to send one's child to a Catholic
school.
5 9
It is clear that this Act, and others like it, were animated largely by
substantive opposition to and suspicion toward the teachings and in-
stitution of the Roman Catholic Church.60 In this sense, of course,
the Act was nothing new: anti-Catholicism is, some say, our nation's
oldest prejudice,6' and the early history of American public educa-
tion, starting in the early-mid-nineteenth century, is in large part the
story of the efforts of America's "de facto [Protestant] establishment,"62
and later the self-styled Progressive vanguard, to respond to perceived
threats to the national character posed by massive immigration and by
the religion of the immigrants. 63 After the Civil War, wild-eyed de-
must ordinarily yield to the state's authority to define what constitutes children's best
interests and its interest in educating children to be good citizens.").
58 STEPHEN MACEDO, DivEsrry AND DismuST, at ix (2000). Macedo claims that
while "[o]ur central aims are the protection of individual freedom and preservation
of stable, limited, and orderly government .... to plan for these great political goods
we need to think very broadly about how liberal citizens become capable of their great
office." Id. at 275. See generally Amy Gutmann, Religious Freedom and Civic Responsibility,
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 907 (1999); Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School
Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KtNT L.
REV. 417 (2000). For a powerful critique of such and similar claims, see Michael W.
McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453 (2000).
59 SeePierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530-31 (1925). The Act "require[d]
every... person having control or charge or custody of a child between 8 and 16 years
to send him 'to a public school' . . . and failure to do so [was] declared a misde-
meanor." Id. at 530 (citing the Compulsory Education Act, 1922 Or. Laws 5259).
60 See Carter, supra note 27, at 1203 ("[Pierce] must be understood in a historical
context in which the Justices knew as well as anybody that the Oregon law was, in
large part, an effort to destroy Roman Catholicism."). For a "revisionist"-and, in my
judgment, mistaken-reading of Pierce and its context, see MACEDO, supra note 58, at
99 ("We should ... also take account of legitimate considerations advanced on behalf
of the Oregon law, for it was not simply motivated by anti-Catholic prejudice."); id, at
303 n.38.
61 SeeJOHN TRAmc ELus, AMFRICAN CATHoLiCiSM 151 (2d ed. 1969) (quoting Ar-
thur Schlesinger, Sr.).
62 MARK DEWOLPE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 31 (1965). As Henry
Adams observed, in the elite society of his boyhood, "[s]ocial perfection wag... sure,
because human nature worked for Good, and three instruments were all she asked-
Suffrage, Common Schools, and Press. On these points doubt was forbidden." TuE
EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMis 33 (Modem Library ed. 1996).
63 Thomas Jefferson once expressed his hope that a system of public schools
would bring about "a quiet euthanasia of the heresies of bigotry and fanaticism which
have so long triumphed over human reason .... " Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
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nunciations of the "sectarian" schools were a regular staple in Republi-
can organs like Harper's Weekly and in the illustrations of Thomas Nast.
"It must be remembered," Haper swarned, "that the primary object of
the Roman party is not the education of the children, but the mainte-
nance and extension of the Roman sect. The plan is to make the
schools nurseries of Roman Catholicism-a plan which every good cit-
izen should strenuously oppose."64
In a similar vein, for the evidently quite progressive majority of
Oregon citizens, egged on by the Ku Klux Klan and other anti-Catho-
lic organizations, 65 the tasks of "social reproduction" and assimilation
demanded that students attend public, not "sectarian," schools.
These tasks required that children receive what Macedo calls a "civic
education"66 consistent with common American values and that they
be protected from the influence of foreign superstition or authorita-
rian religion.67 In other words, Oregon's law appears to have been
William Short (Oct. 31, 1819), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THo.%tSJEFrnn.
SON 694 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1972). See generally Citu.Es LESUE
GLENN, JRt., THE MXTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988); LLOY P. JORGE:sox, THE
STATE AID THE NON-PUBuc SCHOOL 1825-1925 (1987);JosEPH P. Vrrrrl, CHoos-
ING EQUALrryn SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AM CIL SOCIETV 145-79 (1999);
John T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intellectual Imagi-
nation, 1928-1960, 84J. AM. HisT. 97 (1997).
64 The Parochial Schools, HARPER'S WFLx., Apr. 10, 1875, at 294.
65 See MAcEDO, supra note 58, at 98-103 (noting, for instance, that "the Oregon
mandatory public school attendance law... had gained substantial support in other
states... [and] was supported by populists");Jay S. Bybee, SubstantheDuePress and
Free Exercise of Rligion: Meyer, Pierce, and the Origins of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CG,,. U.
L. REV. 887, 891 (1996) (noting that the Oregon Act was "the result of complex
forces, uniting groups as disparate as the Ku Klux Klan and the progressives, both of
which advocated the 'Americanization' of the state's young people"); McConnell,
supra note 58, at 461 ("Who would guess that this argument ias made on behalf ofa
hateful law passed at the urging of the Ku Klux Klan for the purpose of closing Catho-
lic schools?" (citing David B. Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Badtground of the Pierce
Case, 74 A1mR. HIST. REv% 74 (1968))).
66 MAcEDo, supra note 58, at 149-228.
67 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 526 (1925) (arguments of counsel)
("It would... be both unjust and unreasonable to prevent [the states] from taking
the steps which each may deem necessary and proper for Americanizing its new immi-
grants and developing them into patriotic and law-abiding citizens."); id. at 525 (argu-
ments of counsel) (contending that "religious suspicions" in America were
attributable to "the separation of children along religious lines during the most sus-
ceptible years of their lives, with the inevitable awakening of a consciousness of sepa-
ration, and a distrust and suspicion of those from whom they were so carefully
guarded"). See generally MAcEDo, supra note 58, at 88-109; Carter, supra note 27, at
1200-03 (describing Pierce's historical context).
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motivated less by a desire to do right by poor children than by a fear
that Catholic schools would do wrong to them.
68
Given that the Compulsory Education Act was comfortably conso-
nant with the smart-set views of the day,69 it is perhaps surprising that
the Supreme Court, without dissent, struck down the law. The Court
relied on its earlier decision in Meyer v. Nebraska,70 where it had struck
down a nativist but not uncommon law against teaching in any lan-
guage other than English, insisting, in Lochner-esque terms, that the
Constitution protects, "[w]ithout doubt,.., not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also... those privileges long recognized at coin-
mon law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."71 The Meyer Court closed by emphasizing: "That the state may
do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its
citizens, physically, mentally, and morally, is clear; but the individual
has certain fundamental rights which must be respected."
72
Two years later, turning back Oregon's aggressively assimilationist
effort to homogenize children's values, the Pierce Court insisted that,
notwithstanding the "power of the state reasonably to regulate all
schools,"73
the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control.... The fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
68 Oregon was also concerned, apparently, that, just as surely as pool leads to
Trouble, Catholic schools could lead to schools run by "bolshevists, syndicalists, and
communists." Pierce, 268 U.S. at 526 (arguments of counsel). Interestingly, although
he seems embarrassed by the Klannish underbelly of the arguments for the Oregon
Act, Stephen Macedo nonetheless insists that the Act's supporters were on to
something.
Reasonable measures to promote civic virtues are to be distinguished from
the extremism of those who tried to force Catholic children to read the Prot-
estant Bible... and the Klan. Prejudice against Catholics is also to be distin-
guished from perhaps reasonable fears that those educated in relatively
authoritarian religious doctrines may be more prone than others to reject
liberal democratic political norms and institutions.
MACEDO, supra note 58, at 130.
69 John Dewey, for example, insisted that parents should not be permitted to "in-
noculate" their children with the outdated and useless religious beliefs that they "hap-
pen[ed] to have found serviceable to themselves." STEVEN C. RocKIELLER, JOHN
DEwav. RELIGIOUS FAITH AND DEMOCRATIC HuMANIsM 260 (1991); see alSoJOHN DEWEY,
A COMMON FAr (1934).
70 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
71 Id. at 399.
72 Id. at 401.
73 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
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power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.
74
I suspect that many law professors and political philosophers do
not like this passage. 75 And although the Supreme Court keeps re-
affirming that the "primary role of the parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring Amer-
ican tradition,"7 6 the federal courts tend generally to treat Pierce like a
74 Id. at 534-35; cf. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DEcLAmTON ON4 CHRIsTLAN EnucA.
-IoN, at No. 3 (1965) ("[S]ince parents have conferred life on their children, they*
have a most solemn obligation to educate their offspring. Hence, parents must be
acknowledged as the first and foremost educators of their children.").
75 See Carter, supra note 27, at 1194 ("When scholars meet to discuss the great
pantheon of constitutional rights .... we are not much concerned with the right to
direct the upbringing of children; indeed, I suspect that many scholars disbelieve in
it .. ."); see also Dwyer, supra note 12, at 1447 (concluding that "[c]ourts should
acknowledge the illegitimacy of the parents' rights doctrine and decline to recognize
claims of parents rights in the future" and that "[the evolution of our social attitudes
[provides sufficient ground] for overruling... Pierce"); Abner S. Greene, lWi7y louchers
Are Unconstitutional, and Why They're Not, 13 NOTRE DA.MJ.L Erincs & PuB. POL'Y 397,
406-08 (1999) (arguing that Pierce be "reconsidered" and for "requir[ing] public
schooling, ensuring that children are exposed to multiple sources of value"); cf.
MAcEno, supra note 58, at 101 ("I do not... want to go so far as to argue that Maer
and Pierce were wrongly decided .. ").
76 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 202, 232 (1972); see also Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.
Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000) (citing cases); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)
(affirming "[the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child"); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (holding that parents' child-rearing rights are "in-
trinsic human rights, as they have been understood in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion"); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 (affirming the "fundamental interest of parents, as
contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their
children"). In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the court noted:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prepara-
tion for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.... And it is in
recognition of this that... decisions have respected the private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter.
Id. at 166. True, the Court has, from the beginning, hedged its pronouncements on
parental control. Even in Pirc4 the Court was careful to acknowledge the "power of
the State reasonably to regulate all schools." Pierr4 268 U.S. at 534. And, in Pince, the
Court insisted that neither parents' prerogatives nor "the family itself" is beyond all
police-power regulation. 321 U.S. at 166 ("[T]he family itself is not beyond regula-
tion in the public interest. ... [The] rights of parenthood are [not] beyond limita-
tion."); see also, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) ("The State's right-
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quirky aged relative who, although she is still invited to Thanksgiving
dinner, is watched nervously for fear she will embarrass the family and
start tossing mashed potatoes.
77
In my view, though, the above-quoted passage from Pierce is no
dusty anachronism but is instead one of the more inspiring and truly
liberating statements in the United States Reports. The "fundamental
theory of liberty" it endorses is, rightly understood, all the more to be
embraced for being today so widely challenged.7 And Pierce is widely
challenged, despite having been (sort of) re-affirmed just last summer
in TroxeL79 In Troxel, the Supreme Court of Washington had struck
down, as a violation of fundamental Pierce rights, a "breathtakingly
indeed, duty-to protect minor children through a judicial determination of their
interests in a neglect proceeding is not challenged here.").
77 The Pierce Court's reference to "reasonable regulation," 268 U.S. at 534, has
caused many courts to treat the freedom vindicated in that case as a "poor relation"
which must ride piggy-back on some other right in order to enjoy meaningful constitu-
tional protection. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) ("We see no
reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of
Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the
status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances."). These courts have
failed to employ the "strict scrutiny" usually required in "fundamental rights" cases.
See Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir.
1996) (concluding that because parents' "interest is not religious.... we must reject
their position if the [challenged regulation] bear[s] some rational relationship to
legitimate state purposes"); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 462 (2d
Cir. 1996) ("[W]here, as here, parents seek for secular reasons to exempt their child
from an educational requirement and the basis is a claimed right to direct the 'up-
bringing' of their child, rational basis review applies."); Ohio Ass'n of Indep. Sch. v.
Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that "rational basis review, not strict
scrutiny," governs "wholly secular limitations on private school education"); Brown v.
Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995) ("We need not
decide here whether the right to rear one's children is fundamental . . ").
78 Which is not necessarily to endorse the opinion's substantive-due-process rea-
soning. See Troxe 120 S. Ct at 2074 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Pierce was
decided in "an era rich in substantive due process holdings that have since been repu-
diated"); MAcEDo, supra note 58, at 98-103 (discussing connections between Pierce
and Lochner-style substantive due process).
79 120 S. CL at 2060 (plurality opinion). I say that Pierce was "sort of" re-affirmed
in Troxelbecause the Court did not appear to apply, nor did it give any indication that
it would apply in the future, the kind of strict scrutiny that laws touching "fundamen-
tal" rights are usually thought to require. See id. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring),
Our decision in [Pierce] holds that parents have a fundamental constitutional
right to rear their children, including the right to determine who shall edu-
cate and socialize them. The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and
Justice Souter recognize such a right, but curiously none of them articulates
the appropriate standard of review. I would apply strict scrutiny to infringe-
ments of fundamental rights.
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broad" 0 third-party-visitation law, which authorized courts to avard
visitation rights to third parties, over parents' objections, whenever vis-
itation is in the child's best interests. Although the four-Justice plural-
ity opinion was careful to avoid prejudicing the case of third-party-
visitation las generally,81 it objected strongly to the fact that, under
the Washington statute, "a parent's decision that visitation would not
be in the child's best interest is accorded no deference"-that,
"should the judge disagree with the parent's estimation of the child's
best interests, the judge's view necessarily prevails."82 Because "the
Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the funda-
mental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because
a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made,"83 the Court
invalidated the application of the visitation law.
8 4
Troxel and the Supreme Court aside, the challenges to Pierce come
on (at least) two fronts.8 5 First, there are those who insist that parents'
educational preferences must yield to the public need to produce citi-
zens of a certain ideological cast and deliberative temperament and
that both children and society are harmed if parents transmit mis-
guidedly illiberal views and beliefs to their children. Stephen Macedo
in particular has grown impatient with what he regards as hand-wring-
Id. I should add that I drafted amicus curiae briefs for the Society of Catholic Social
Scientists and the Christian Legal Society in support of the respondents in the Troxd
case.
80 120 S. Ct. at 2061 (plurality opinion) ("[The] language effectively permits any
third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning isitation
of the parent's children to state-court review.").
81 See i& at 2064 (plurality opinion) ("Because much state-court adjudication in
this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific
nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a perse matter."). &e
generally Joan C. Bohl, Grandparent Viitation Law Grows Up: The Trend Towtard Awarding
Visitation Only When the Child W1oud Otherwise SufferHann, 48 DR,-j L REV. 279 (2000);
Joan C. Bohl, The "Unprecedented Intrusion": A Survey and Analysis of Sdeted Grandparent
V'sitation Cases, 49 OIUA. L. R-xv. 29 (1996). For a recent state-court decision involving
a more carefully crafted grandparent-visitation statute in which the court nonetheless
insisted that the Constitution limits states' power to authorize visitation over parents'
objections, see generally Hampton v. Hampton, 17 S.W.3d 599 (Mo. CL App. 2000).
82 120 S. Ct. at 2061 (plurality opinion).
83 Id. at 2064 (plurality opinion).
84 See id. at 2065 (plurality opinion) ("We therefore hold that the application of
[the visitation law] to Granville and her fhmily violated her due process right to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters.").
85 There is at least one more line of attack-the argument that, whatever we
think about parental liberty as a moral matter, the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment simply does not confer on federal judges the power to strike
down duly enacted state laws that restrict that liberty. Se, eg., id. at 2074-75 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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ing versions of liberalism, versions whose ability to justify using gov-
ernment to shape civic life and public values-in Pierces words, to
"standardize" children-is, he thinks, hamstrung by their undue focus
on "the boundaries and limits of individual rights."8 6 As Michael Mc-
Connell has observed, "it is difficult or impossible for a liberal state to
engage in the direct inculcation of public virtue without compromis-
ing its liberal commitment to neutrality among the different and com-
peting reasonable worldviews of the society."8 7 Macedo responds to
this difficulty by calling unabashedly for a "more judgmental liber-
alism," one that is wary of and aggressive in opposing "religious enthu-
siasm" and that-Pierce notwithstanding-uses not only the public
schools, but "all of the instruments of public policy," to "shape [the]
social norms and meanings that mold individual choices and
character."
88
There are also those who claim that Pierce-style notions of paren-
tal control are inconsistent with a proper focus on the present and
future interests of children and who contend that children have a
right to be exposed to a sufficiently wide range of ideas and ways of
life and to be assisted in developing the capacities necessary to exer-
cise and enjoy meaningful autonomy.8 9 Professor Dwyer argues, for
example, that parents' child-rearing rights-as opposed to their legal
86 MAcEDo, supra note 58, at 278.
87 McConnell, supra note 58, at 455.
88 MACEDo, supra note 58, at 278, 276, 277. But see, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho.
dox .... "). Professor Abner Greene has suggested a related, but distinct, critique of
Pierce. In Greene's view, "[o]ur constitutional structure is one of multiple repositories
of power .... " Pierce's "assumption that parents must have the right to school their
children as they wish" violates this key structural principle, because it "ensures that
children will get their basic education not from multiple sources, but rather from
their parents or their parents' agents alone .... " Greene, supra note 75, at 406-07. It
seems unlikely that even the most robust reading and vigorous implementation of
Pierce could, in today's society, do anything to prevent children from being influenced
substantially by a wide variety of sources other than their parents. Nor am I convinced
that our constitutional strategy of protecting liberty by dividing and limiting state
power points toward restrictions on parents' traditional authority to educate their
children.
89 See generallyJoel Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHosE CuiLD?
CHLDREN's RIGHTS, PARENTAL AuTHORInY, AND STATE POWER 124 (William Aiken &
Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980); Goldstein, supra note 30, at 645 ("The law is designed to
assure for each child an opportunity to meet and master the developmental crises on
the way to adulthood-to that critical age when he or she is presumed by the state to
be qualified to determine what is 'best' for oneself."); Laurence D. Houlgate, Three
Concepts of Children's Constitutional Rights: Reflections on the Enjoyment Theory, 2 U. PA. J.
CONsT. L. 77 (1999).
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privilege to act in accord with their own moral duties and their chil-
dren's rights9 0-are unjustifiable, but not so much because parental
control of education compromises the task of social reproduction or
undermines the workings of civic education. Rather, he views Pierce
rights as inconsistent with bedrock liberal commitments to the indi-
vidual autonomy and self-determination rights of children. After all,
he insists, "no one is entitled to control the life of another person in
accord with their own preferences .... .91
These are serious objections, but I will stick with Pierce and try to
take it seriously.92 As I will try to show next, neither the perceived
demands of political soulcraft, nor an appropriate respect for the dig-
nity and personhood of children, undermines Pierce or supplies the
liberal state with the legal power or moral right to standardize the
thoughts and values of children over the objection of their parents.
First, the liberal-statist objection: According to "judgmental liber-
alism,"93 liberal citizens are made, not born, and they are made care-
fully, through a certain kind of civic education. Parents have a role to
play, but they should not determine the fundamental values and ide-
als toward which a child should be trained to aspire. And so, the ob-
jection from this camp to Pierce is its lack of fit with the State's need to
engage in the kind of values inculcation it requires to maintain itself.
After all, if given free rein, parents could obstruct or garble the State's
messages, or perhaps even convey contrary ones.
This argument is as old as The Republic. It will not likely be settled
any time soon, and I cannot do justice to it here. I am tempted to say,
with the Supreme Court in Meyer, only that while the Spartans might
90 See Dwyer, supra note 10, at 1374-76 (contrasting "rights" itI "pri ilegese and
arguing that parents enjoy the privilege, but not the right, of making child-rearing
decisions). Although I share many of Professor Glendon's reservations about the at-
omizing tendencies of "rights talk," I am confident that parents enjoy more than a
mere positive-law "privilege" to decide how best to raise and educate their children.
See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHrs TALIC THE LIPo\ __MS Er,-ir OF PoLrrc,%u.
DiscoURsa (1991).
91 Dwyer, supra note 3, at 173.
In my view, neither parents nor the State have any moral claim on their owm
behalf, any entitlement to decide what the ends of a child's life are. Rather,
only children themselves have any moral claim or entitlement in connection
with their upbringing, and we adults should be deliberating about how best
to fulfill our obligation to them, not about which adults are entitled to deter-
mine how children's lives will go.
IcL
92 See Carter, supra note 27, at 1195 ("I want to speculate ... on the possibility
that Pierce is both rightly decided and rightly reasoned ...
93 MAcEDo, supra note 58, at 278.
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well have seen fit to "submerge the individual and develop ideal citi-
zens, . . . their ideas touching the relation between individual and
State were wholly different from those upon which our institutions
rest. '9 4 Or, as Justice Brennan put it, "Plato offered a vision of a uni-
fied society, where the needs of children are not met by parents but by
the government, and where no intermediate forms of association
stand between the individual and the State. The vision is a brilliant
one, but it is not our own."95 Perhaps not. Still, as Oregon's Compul-
sory Education Act and the common-school movement vividly illus-
trate, when it comes to educating children and forming citizens, "our
own" tradition has often been tempted by the ideals of the "Spartans."
And in failing to reject these ideals, our tradition has, at times, fallen
short.
96
This is not to say that we should ignore the dangers of an overly
atomistic public philosophy or an uncritical celebration of pluralism
in morality.9 7 It is true, we cannot take for granted the cultural condi-
tions of democracy and self-government. 98 But as Professor McCon-
nell has pointed out, "a liberal society is always at risk. One can hope
that the free institutions of civil society will produce virtuous citizens,
each in its own way .... But there is no guarantee."99 By humbling
government, and by respecting parents, families, and other "free insti-
tutions of civil society," we take a chance. And we tie our own
hands 00 when we swear off using government to indoctrinate other
94 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
95 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 632 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added).
96 See generally, e.g., McConnell, supra note 58.
97 See generally GLENDON, supra note 90; MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMocRAcy's DISCON.
TENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBUC PHILOSOPHY (1996).
98 See MACEDO, supra note 58, at 279 ("Our good fortune in having developed
institutions that foster ... shared civic values must neither lull us into complacency
nor encourage reforms that rashly overlook the advantages of the system we have.").
Still, as Michael McConnell has reminded us, "in the liberal tradition, it is thought
that citizens of a political community need not share common values regarding the
nature of the good life .... All must agree to live and let live. We need not agree on
much more than that." McConnell, supra note 58, at 454.
99 McConnell, supra note 58, at 457.
100 See Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the
Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 499-502 (1996) (discussing the "self-paternal-
ism" inherent in our Constitution); Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the
"First Freedom"?, 21 CAumozo L. REV. 1243, 1254 (2000) ("Disestablishment of religion
meant that democratic politics in America was deprived of a key instrument for social
reproduction.").
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people's children-and they are other people's children' 0 1-in those
contested views of the good that a particular majority happens to find
most conducive to the development of judgmental liberalism's
values.
102
The second, child-centered, critique of Pierce concedes that chil-
dren are not the mere creatures of the State, but insists that they are
not the mere creatures of their parents, either.10 3 According to this
view, Pierce-style child-rearing rights are inconsistent with the dignity
and personhood of children because they, in effect, reduce children
to property.10 4 And it is said that the parental-control idea is inconsis-
tent with the best interests of children, both because it rests on the
dubious presumption that parents will alwa)s perceive and act in ac-
cord with the best interests of their children,10 5 and because it limits
the ability of state officials and other experts to correctly identify and
advance those interests. What is more, parental control over educa-
tion is said to be inconsistent with children's future best interests, that
is, in their interests in growing up to have certain capacities, exper-
iences, and dispositions that are, in the State's view, associated with
autonomy and necessary for flourishing 0 6
101 AsJustice Scalia remarked during oral argument in Trol, "The child does not
belong to the courts. The child belongs to the parents." Virsiation Rights Challenged,
Cm. SuN-Tn s, Jan. 13, 2000, at 22. But see, e.g., Jessica C. Cox, Parental Rights and
Responsibilities of Control Over Childrens Education, 26J.L. & EDuc. 179, 179 (1997) ("In
the debate over who controls the education of our nation's children, it is the lives of
these natural resources that are at stake . . ").
102 But see Greene, supra note 53, at 2. It is worth noting here that many believe
that parental control in education and, more particularly, religious education, serves
quite well the civic needs of liberalism. See, e.g., James IV. Caeser & Patrick J.
McGuinn, Civic Education Reconsidered, 133 THE PUB. INr. 84 (1998) (arguing that re-
ligious schools are teaching the values upon which civic education is based); McCon-
nell, supra note 58, at 473 (citing research showing that "religious Americans are
more democratically engaged than most of their fellow citizens"); Christian Smith &
David Sikkink, Is Private School Privatizing?, 92 FiRST THiNs 16 (1999) (noting that
families whose children attend home schools or private religious or private non-relig-
ious schools are more likely to participate in civic life); Richard Boyd, Including Us
Out, COmmoNwALTH, Sept. 22, 2000, at 25, 26 (noting that "ostensibly 'illiberal' insti-
tutions like the family, church, and parochial schools may offer just the values that
liberal democratic institutions themselves are incapable of providing").
103 See Dwyer, supra note 12, at 1446 ("[The child is... not the mere creature of
the parent... [but is rather] his or her oun person.").
104 See MfAcDo, supra note 58, at 100 (discussing connection between Pierce and
opposition to child-labor laws). See generally Woodhouse, supra note 23, at 1059-68.
105 See Dwyer, supra note 3, at 169-70.
106 See generally DwYvR, supra note 15, at 148-77 (arguing that regulation of relig-
ious schools is required in order to insure that children in those schools are given
equal opportunity to develop self-esteem, self-respect, and self-determination).
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These objections are misplaced. It is not enough-though it is
surely right-to affirm the human dignity of children. There is still
no avoiding the fact that someone is going to make decisions about chil-
dren's lives, their education, and their religious training; saying it
should be parents rather than bureaucrats or activists in no way makes
chattel out of children, and saying it should be the State rather than
parents shows no greater respect for children's dignity and auton-
omy.10 7 Thus, Pierce and parental control in education generally are
grounded not on archaic and patriarchal prejudices, but on the com-
mon-sense, truly child-centered belief that, in Professor Stephen
Gilles's words, "parents are more likely to pursue the child's best inter-
est as they define it than is the State to pursue the child's best interest
as the state defines it."108
And there is more to Pierce than Gilles's hard-to-dispute predic-
tive judgment. Surely, the attitude toward a child that best reflects an
appreciation for her dignity as a human person is not the disem-
bodied paternalism of a government functionary, or even the genuine
concern of a well-meaning case-worker, but the love of a parent. A
parent loves this child; the Government, its experts, and well-meaning
third parties, try as they might, most likely do not. A parent has a
moral obligation to nurture and protect this child,109 this child who
can only be, to the Government, simply a particular manifestation of
an abstraction-"children"-whose best interests the State has
charged itself with advancing. Parental control is a this-child-centered,
truly personalist, value, while state control, it seems to me, respects
the personhood of children only if one believes that there is some-
thing dignified about being regarded by a hubristic state as a policy
datum to be manipulated by third parties in accord with best-interests
generalities.110
107 See, e.g., U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, supra note 4, §§ 2221-22 (noting both
that "the right and the duty of parents to educate their children are primordial and
inalienable" and that "parents must regard their children as children of God and
respect them as human persons").
108 Gilles, supra note 21, at 940. See generally id. at 951-60; Goldstein, supra note
30, at 654 ("No one has a greater right or responsibility and no one can be presumed
to be in a better position ... than a child's parents to decide.").
109 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[T]he custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hin-
der."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("[T]hose who nurture [the
child] and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations." (emphasis added)).
110 See C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RESJUDIQaTAE 224, 228
(1952) ("Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may
TAKING PIERCE SERIOUSLY
As I read the decision, Pierce is not really about the power of par-
ents over children but about the State's lack of power over its citizens
generally."' Pierce is a rejection of state omnipotence, not children's
personhood. 112 Pierce affirms, not that the child is the property of the
parent, but that the child is not the property of the State. 113 On this
reading, child-rearing authority and family integrity are not
anachronistically despotic licenses to control the lives of others, but
rather illustrate "first principles" of limited, liberal government.
114
And nothing in PiercA so read, at all undermines the human dignity of
the child, nor contravenes her moral right to be assisted in her human
development and to be the focus of any debate about her
treatment.1
1 5
In fact, the parental authority and family integrity recognized and
defended in Pierce are genuinely liberating for children. After all, we
think of ourselves as free when, among other things, decisions about
our best interests are made by us or our agents and not by the Govern-
ment. What reason is there for thinking that, in contested matters of
education, values, and faith, a child's dignity is more respected, and
her autonomy better served, when her "best interests" in those matters
are determined by the State, rather than by her family? Pierce
promises children that decisions about their best interests will be
made by those who, generally speaking, are most likely to work consci-
entiously, motivated by love and moral obligation, to adv-ance their
be the most oppressive.... [T]hose who torment us for our ownm good uill torment
us without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience.").
111 See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28 (Wash. 1998) ("In answering
whether the state visitation statutes at issue serve a compelling state interest 'we must
understand the sources of state power to intrude on family life."), aff'd sub nora.
Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
112 Cf. McConnell, supra note 100, at 1247 ("If the state does not have power over
the church, it follows that the power of the state is limited.").
113 Thus, Pierce seems to be in accord with Professor Dw yer's claim that "the child
is... not the mere creature of the parent... [; rather, the child is] his or her on
person." Dwyer, supra note 12, at 1446; see also Dwyer, supra note 3, at 177 ("There are
widely shared moral beliefs and legal rules about how we should treat people simply
by virtue of their personhood.").
114 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (emphasizing "first princi-
ples" of constitutionally limited government). As William Galston put it, the Pierce
line establishes and stands for two propositions. "First, in a liberal democracy, there
is ... a division of authority between parents and the state.... Second, there are
some things the liberal state may not do, even in the name of forming good citizens."
Gaston, supra note 17, at 874 (emphasis added).
115 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) ("Properly understood.., the
tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual lib-
erty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter.").
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best interests." 6 DeanJohn Garvey has shown that this is a promise of
real freedom to children, a promise to respect their liberty by respect-
ing the decisions of their best agents, rather than by taking them into
government wardship." 7 It appears that to the extent the child-cen-
tered critique rejects Pierce rights as inconsistent with the personhood
and dignity of children, it fails to appreciate the best rationale for that
decision.
In sum, Pierce makes moral sense. We need not apologize for talk-
ing about and defending parents' rights to control their children's
education. Such talk is appropriately child-centered; it is personalist,
not statist. Pierce does not mean parents have dominion over their chil-
dren and their children's education; it does mean that popular majori-
ties and well-meaning third parties-however confident they might be
in their own virtue or powers of perception-lack the moral authority
to override parents' child-rearing decisions on the basis of what they
believe to be the "best interests" of other people's children.,,
116 Cf Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 820 (9th Gir. 1999) ("The government's
interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physi-
cal abuse, but also protecting children's interest in the privacy and dignity of their
homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents.").
117 SeeJOHN GARVEY, WHATARE FREEDoMs FOR? 97-122 (1996). Garvey notes, inter
alia, that the "problem" with "allow[ing] the government to override a parent's
choice about her child's proper education ... is that, in the effort to make children
more free vis-A-vis their parents, the government makes children less free in their
relations with the state." Id. at 122. Although the child-centered critique of Pierce
aims at creating and protecting children's self-determination, children "are not free
when the government represents them .... [T]heir actions are not free because they
are directed by the government." Id. at 121. It is worth adding, with respect to the
autonomy-based objections to Pierce, Garvey's observations, first, that, even if the point
of state supervention of parental educational control is to "keep choices open" for
children, so that they can "self-determine" when they grow up, the choices those chil-
dren make will be "guided by values, talents, and propensities that are themselves
largely the result of parental influences"; and second, that,
[e]ven if parents could promote self-determination by offering [their chil-
dren] a smorgasbord, it is not objectively clear that they should. Autonomy
is an idealjust as knowledge, power, virtue, and the service of God are ideals.
Each states a certain view of what people ought to be like, of how they can
best live their lives. Adults do not all subscribe to the same ideal, and courts
should not require children to.
Id. at 117.
118 See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30-31 (Wash. 1998).
Short of preventing harm to the child, the standard of "best interest of the
child" is insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overrnling a par-
ent's fundamental rights .... It is not within the province of the state to
make significant decisions concerning the custody of children merely be-
cause it could make a "better" decision.
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IV. RELGION AND (AS?) HAMI To CHL.DRE,
If we take Pierce seriously, state supervention of parents' educa-
tional authority is justified only to prevent hann to a child and not to
inculcate those values that the State believes will best serve its own, or
the child's, "best interests."11 9 The Supreme Court had a chance in
Troxel to emphasize this point, but it dropped the ball.1 0 The Wash-
ington Supreme Court, though, put it at the center of its decision.
That court's objection to the third-party-visitation statute was not
merely that it was applied heavy-handedly, but that it permitted visita-
tion orders, over parents' objection, whenever "visitation may serve the
best interest of the child ... "121 Because "it is undisputed that par-
ents have a fundamental right to autonomy in child rearing deci-
sions,"1 22 interference with those decisions "is justified only if the state
can show that it has a compelling interest and such interference is
narrowly drawn to meet only the compelling state interest
involved."1
23
In that court's view, pursuing the "best interests" of children, as
seen by particular trial-court judges and in opposition to the parents'
wishes, is not a compelling state interest. Rather, traditional police
and parens patriae powers authorize the State to "intrude on a family's
autonomy" only "where a child has been harmed or where there is a
threat of harm to a child.' 24 Of course, there are all kinds of situa-
tions where children might be better off, in a third party's view, or
perhaps even in fact, if a particular parental decision-say, to en-
courage or permit the child to play soccer rather than baseball, prefer
Britney Spears to Willie Dixon, or read law-review articles rather than
the Narnia chronicles-were overridden. But then, as the court ob-
Id.
119 This statement is consistent with the "minimum state intervention" model set
out in GOLUs-mN ET At-, supra note 14. See also Goldstein, supra note 30, at 648-51.
120 See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2064 (2000).
Because we rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of [the statute] and
the application of that broad, unlimited power in this case, we do not con-
sider the primary constitutional question passed on by tie Washington Sit-
preme Court-whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental
visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the
child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. We do not, and need
not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the
visitation context.
id.
121 969 P.2d at 24.
122 Id. at 27.
123 Id. at 28; cf. Troxe, 120 S. Ct. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring).
124 969 P.2d at 28.
20001
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
served, "the authority to raise the child as the parents see fit, except
when the State thinks another choice would be better, is... no au-
thority at all." 12-5 And, moving from visitation orders to decisions
about education and religious training, a right to direct the education
of one's children that is subject to best-interests ratification or veto by
the State is an empty and ineffectual right.126
Am I suggesting that we should be cavalier about children's best
interests? Of course not. Still, taking Pierce seriously does require us
to tolerate the fact that some parents will, in the opinion of most "out-
siders," incorrectly perceive and inadequately promote their chil-
dren's best interests. But the world is full of second-bests. We tolerate
imperfection and imprecision all the time, because the "costs" of elim-
inating them-here, the costs of statist perfectionism-are too
great.127 A demanding harm requirement reflects a trade-off; we risk
the chance that some parents, sometimes, will fail to act in their
child's best interests to insure that the State does not simply intervene
to re-educate children whenever parents' (or children's) decisions
125 Id. at 30 (quoting Kathleen Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Rifuse?,
24 U. Louisvz.E J. FAm. L. 393, 441 (1985-86)); see also Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d
573, 580 (Tenn. 1993) ("The requirement of harm is the sole protection that parents
have against pervasive state interference in the parenting process."); Bean, supra, at 31
("Short of preventing harm to the child, the standard of 'best interest of the child' is
insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling a parent's fundamental
rights.").
126 None of this calls into question the black-letter family-law rule that courts as-
sign custody on the basis of the "best interests of the child." This is what courts called
to adjudicate family and custodial disputes should do. But the question, "what is in the
best interests of [some other person's) child?," is not the right standard for identifying
those situations when the Government may, as an initial matter, interfere with or in-
trude upon the family. Custody cases leave courts with little choice other than to
engage in fantastically elaborate balancing exercises in order to identify that elusive
arrangement that will serve the child's "best interests." See Carl E. Schneider, Religion
and Child Custody, 25 U. MicH. J.L. RxroRm 879, 904 (1992) ("Courts have to make
custody decisions, and to make them as well as possible .... Courts must do what
courts must do; they should avoid doing what they can do only badly."). In the educa-
tional context, unlike the child-custody context, the "costs" of intervention in the
family--and these are costs-are not already sunk.
127 See Goldstein, supra note 30, at 670 ("[1It is the absence of a substantial societal
consensus about the legitimacy of state intrusion on parental autonomy... which is
the best evidence for holding in check the use of state power to impose highly per-
sonal values on those who do not share them."); Schneider, supra note 126, at 904
("Children will sometimes suffer because of their parents' disputes over religion. But
we live with such disputes.. . all the time.").
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conflict with the ideological commitments, or "rescue fantasies," of
government functionaries. 128
So, what "counts" as "harm"? I suggested earlier that the re-
quired-medical-treatment cases and questions about spiritual-treat-
ment exemptions are made somewhat less difficult (though certainly
not easy) by the fact that everyone agrees that the harm in question
really is a harm.129 People might strike differently the balance be-
tween the competing interests, in keeping ith their different philo-
sophical commitments, but there is still this agreement. What
children should be taught to believe, however, is simply not a question
of fact; it is an inescapably ideological, political, moral, and religious
question. Reasonable pluralism is a given which, as I have tried to
show, directs us in the debate over educational control away from a
"best interests" focus and toward a "prevent harm" standard. But the
education debate is not like the spiritual-treatment controversies in
that people disagree not only about "best interests," but about "harm,"
too.
One way to reduce the range of possible disagreements about ed-
ucational harm is to rule out of court the perspectives of insiders,
opinions based on religious commitments, or othenise illiberal views.
If we stipulate that the State may not privilege religious views, and
should not privilege illiberal ones, we can limit the permissible range
of disagreement about harm to those disagreements that persist
among those who subscribe to the secular ideology of the current po-
litical majority.130 Coming at the problem another way, rather than
limiting the kinds of interests and beliefs that may be considered, and
ruling out religious or illiberal ones, we could narrow ex ante the kinds
of things that can "count" as harm justifying government intervention.
128 Goldstein, supra note 30, at 651; see also Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law,
43 HARv. EDuc. REV. 487, 513 (1973) (noting that the best-interests standard is "a
rationalization by decision-makers justif)ng their judgments about a child's future,
like an empty vessel into which adult perceptions and prejudices are poured").
129 If someone were to assert, though, that serious ph)sical injury or death to a
child were not a harm to be avoided (as opposed to claiming that, even though harm-
ful, it must be accepted reluctantly), that view could, I think, be ruled out of the
conversation as simply unreasonable. But again, it is not that religious objectors, gen-
erally speaking, do not think that death is a "harm" to be avoided. They simply disa-
gree, in some cases, with the State about the best uuy to avoid that harm and about
the morally permissible wa)s to avoid that harm. After all, even those "outsiders" who
disagree with spiritual-healing advocates would concede, I suppose, that not all means
of avoiding medical harm to children are permitted. Cf. Galston, supra note 17, at 872
(noting that, in the liberal tradition, not all means of achieving desirable ends are at a
state's disposal).
130 See generaly Dwyer, supra note 3, at 148.
200o]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
For example, we might say that only physical harm counts, effectively
ruling out all government supervention of education-related deci-
sions.'31 After all, what conduct is "abusive" is, outside the physical-
harm context, unavoidably contested.13 2 But a physical-abuse-only
limitation would likely unduly restrict the State's ability to respond to
serious psychological and emotional abuse, abuse that is real notwith-
standing the difficulty of defining it precisely. Are there any other
categorical limits that we can place on what counts as "harm" to
children?
I submit the (fairly modest) suggestion that religious education,
the transmission of religious beliefs and traditions, and the religious
or religion-based content of education should not be a permissible
basis for government intervention or second-guessing. That is, the
Government should neither come to nor act on the conclusion that
religious teaching (as opposed to religiously inspired conduct) or re-
ligious education is harmful, at least not in a sense analogous to the
physical harm that we all agree the Government may act to prevent. It
does not matter if a child's best interests, as the State sees them, are
ill-served by a particular religious teaching or set of beliefs, nor does it
matter if the State thinks that a child would be a better liberal citizen,
or that the preconditions of liberal democracy would be better served,
or that liberalism generally would, in Gutmann's words, be better "re-
produced," if the child were not exposed to that teaching or those
beliefs.
Is such a rule defensible? I think so, and I have tried to outline
such a defense here, inspired by the Court's warning that "[those
who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exter-
minating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only
131 See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 111-27.
132 Compare DwER, supra note 15, at 7-44 (arguing that many children are abused
by traditional religious education), and Greene, supra note 75, at 406 ("Parenttl
choice regarding their children is subject to state intervention when the parent
abuses or neglects the child, and this can involve ... educational abuse or neglect."),
with GoLDsTEIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 114 ("In the face of... uncertainties and
imprecise definitions of 'emotional neglect' and 'serious emotional damage,' neither
concept should be used as a ground for modifying parent-child relationships."), and
Mich. Ass'n Special Educ. Admin. v. Dep't Soc. Servs., 526 N.W.2d 36, 37, 39 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994) (refusing, for purposes of the State's abuse and neglect laws, to treat
"parents' failure to act in conformity with petitioners' opinions regarding... chil-
dren's educational needs" with abuse or "mental injury"). See generally Natalie
Abrams, Problems in Defining Child Abuse and Neglect, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS, PARENTAL AurnriOy, AND STATE POWER 289 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFol-
lette eds., 1980) (arguing that child abuse may be defined as a failure to respect chil-
dren as autonomous individuals).
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the unanimity of the graveyard.... If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox ... .1 3 3 "But seriously," one might
complain, "is there really any danger of religious education, or the
passing on of religious faith, being treated as sufficiently harmful to
justify government intervention?"
Of course there is. The view that traditional or minority religious
beliefs, religious beliefs not adequately re-formed by the premises of
modernity, or religious beliefs that are taken seriously and not treated
as a hobby, are "harmful" to children, both in their personal develop-
ment and in their development as citizens, has been around and influ-
ential for a long time. It was, as I noted earlier, the view of many in
the common-school movement and of many right-thinking twentieth
century "progressives." Harper's was not alone in wondering "whether
cruelty is not taught or necessarily infused in the doctrines of the
Romish Church; whether the triumph of the Jesuits has not con-
demned the great body of its adherents to become the blind instru-
ments of a persecuting creed.... [It cannot] be doubted that such
inhuman teaching must fill with savage aspirations the ignorant and
fanatical-must arouse the worst instincts of man."34
The "religion can be harmful to children" argument has at times
even enjoyed a respectful hearing in at least some of the chambers of
the United States Supreme Court. Justice Douglas, for example, dis-
senting in Wsconsin v. Yode, complained that a child "harnessed to
the Amish way of life" could suffer great harm; her "entire life may be
stunted and deformed," and she could "be forever barred from entry
into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today."1
3 5 If
the child is not equipped to "break from the Amish tradition,"Justice
Douglas asked, how will she "be a pianist or an astronaut or an
oceanographer[?]"136
133 NV. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943); see also Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992) ("[T]he government may no more use social
pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means.").
134 Eugene Lawrence, Hunter's Point-Compulsory Education, 1-uu'aw's WRLv., Dec.
23, 1871, at 1197.
135 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
136 Id. It seems unlikely that Justice Douglas was concerned that most children
educated in public schools are poorly equipped by their education to "break from the
[modernist] tradition" and become devout Amish believers. SimilarlyJustice Stevens,
in his KiyasJod concurrence, questioned the value of "a religious sect's interest in
segregating itself and preventing its children from associating ith their neighbors"
and was concerned that the state law at issue in that case-which authorized an all-
Hasidic village to have its own public-school district-"unquestionably increased the
likelihood that they would remain within the fold, faithful adherents of their parents'
.2000]
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At times, some Justices' hostility toward religious instruction has
degenerated from concerns about children's future opportunities to
ugly assertions about the nature and aims of Catholic education. Re-
call the concurring opinion ofJustices Black and Douglas in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,13 7 where they observed, quoting from a once-popular anti-
Catholic tract:
In the parochial schools Roman Catholic indoctrination is included
in every subject. History, literature, geography, civics, and science
are given a Roman Catholic slant. The whole education of the child
is filled with propaganda. That, of course, is the very purpose of
such schools, the very reason for going to all of the work and ex-
pense of maintaining a dual school system. Their purpose is not so
much to educate, but to indoctrinate and train, not to teach Scrip-
ture truths and Americanism, but to make loyal Roman Catholics.
The children are regimented, and are told what to wear, what to do,
and what to think.' 38
Even today, there are those who echo such sentiments and who be-
lieve that Catholic schools-or, more generally, traditional religious
education-are, or can be, harmful to children, both as citizens and
in their development, and that this purported harm warrants govern-
religious faith." Bd. of Educ. of KiryasJoel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 711
(1994) (Stevens, J., concurring). Why, one wonders, is this a bad thing-that chil-
dren should "remain within the fold"? Does Justice Stevens believe it a proper func-
tion of the liberal State to decrease the likelihood that children remain "faithful
adherents of their parents' religious faith"? Maybe so. Michael McConnell describes
a University of Nebraska study that reported-evidently approvingly-that on-campus
residency reduces the likelihood that college students will retain religious prefer-
ences. "Apparently, the University viewed abandonment of moral and religious up-
bringing as a liberating and enlightening development in the lives of students."
McConnell, supra note 58, at 463 (discussing Rader v. Johnson, 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D.
Neb. 1996)).
137 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
138 Id. at 635 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting LORAINE BoETrN R, RoMIAN CA.
ouLIcsm 360 (1962)). Justice Douglas continued, "One can imagine what a relig-
ious zealot, as contrasted to a civil libertarian, can do with the Reformation or with
the Inquisition." Id. at 635-36. And injustice Black's mind, Catholic schools posed
more than a danger of slanted curricula.
The same powerful sectarian religious propagandists who have succeeded in
securing passage of the present law to help religious schools carry on their
sectarian religious purposes can and doubtless will continue their propa-
ganda, looking toward complete domination and supremacy of their particu-
lar brand of religion. And it nearly always is by insidious approaches that the
citadels of liberty are most successfully attacked.
Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251-52 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
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ment action and restrictions.13 9 This is reason enough, it seems to
me, for concern, and for retrieving and re-affirming Pierce.
Another cause for reasonable concern is the mountain of cases
dealing with the treatment of religious beliefs in the context of child-
custody disputes, cases where courts must decide whether and how the
religious beliefs of parents (and children) should be factored into the
"best interests" inquiry employed in custody matters.1 40 Now, these
139 In Professor Dwyer's view, for example, the world of evangelical Christian,
Catholic, Orthodox Jewish, and other traditional religious schools is heavily popu-
lated by neglected and abused children, who are being harmed as a result of their
parents' decisions and the State's inaction just as surely as a child who is injured or
dies because her parent refuses medical care on religious grounds. Sre Dwvut, supra
note 15, at 62-101 (exploring parents' rights to determine medical treatment for chil-
dren, among other aspects of child-rearing). My own view, though, is that Professor
Dwyer's claims about the harm to children from religious education reflect more his
disagreement with Catholic, Orthodox Jewish, and evangelical Christian doctrine
than a demonstration of "harm" sufficient to justify the kind of regulation he pro-
poses. Although Professor Dwyer's arguments against parents' rights and his defense
of children's welfare, as he sees it, are passionate and powerful, his tendentious por-
trait of Catholic schools, and his claim that these schools-and, evidently, Catholicism
generally-are often harmful to children are seriously undermined by his reliance on
highly polemical accounts of Catholic education and the Catholic Church. SqeJo.,,.E
H. MEEHL, THE RECOVERING CATHOLIC: PERSONALJOuRNES Or WoMEN WHO LEr" THE
CHURCH 69-98 (1995); see also Carter, supra note 27, at 1209 ("[S]uch arguments as
these rest on questionable empirical propositions about what values children learn,
and where, supported principally by anti-religious stereotypes rather than by any hard
analysis of how religions operate."). For a detailed and, in my view, convincing re-
sponse to Professor Dwyer's claim about the "sexist" and othenise damaging nature
of Catholic and other traditional religious schools, see Gilles, supra note 21, at
199-210.
140 For a sma/ sampling of these cases, see, for example, In re marriage of Short, 698
P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo. 1985) (noting that unless religious beliefs are likely to result in
physical or emotional harm, they are not relevant to custody); Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859
P.2d 948 (Idaho 1993) (pointing out that absent compelling reasons, custody pro-
ceedings may not favor religion over non-religion); Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027,
1031-32 (Me. 1980) (vacating custody order on the ground that the trial court
granted custody to the father after giving undue wreight to the mother's religious be-
liefs as aJehovah's Witness); Kendall v. KendalL 687 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. 1997) (hold-
ing that a divorce judgment limiting defendant from sharing certain aspects of his
"fundamentalist" Christian faith with child is constitutional); Harris v. Harris, 343 So.
2d 762, 763 (Miss. 1977) (commenting that the court has no authority to dictate what
religion a parent teaches her child, unless it involves exposing him to physical danger
or to "immoral" practices); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1157 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990) (holding that an order prohibiting parent from taking children to non-Jewish
religious services was unconstitutional); Burmros v. Brady, 605 A.2d 1312, 1316-17 (Ri.
1992) (holding that consideration of religious beliefs or disbeliefs are appropriate
when determining what is in the best interests of the child); Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d
719, 723-25 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a parent's "religious compatibility"
2000]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
are custody cases, cases where, generally speaking, the State has been
called in, most likely by the parents, to adjudicate custody questions
and has not intruded into the sphere of family association. A de-
manding threshold "harm" standard is probably not necessary to pro-
tect family integrity or to act as a check on government overreaching,
because the family has, in effect, submitted itself to the Government
for supervision and adjustment. 141 Still, courts in these cases often
engage in "weighing the relative value" of parents' religious beliefs (or
lack of beliefs) in light of their own sense of what is best for the par-
ents' children. 142 This kind of weighing strikes me as a task for which
courts are dangerously unsuited, and these custody cases caution
strongly against endorsing, in the education context, a government
prerogative to police for "harmful" elements the content of religious
training.143
I cannot emphasize enough that my claim here is not that religion
absolves parents who actually harm their children or that the Constitu-
with a child is an appropriate factor for a court to consider in determining custody);
Varnum v. Varnum, 586 A.2d 1107, 1111-12 (Vt. 1990) (holding that religious practice
must have a direct impact on a child's mental or physical health to be relevant to
custody determination). See also Walker v.Johnson, 891 F. Supp. 1040, 1045-51 (M.D.
Pa. 1995) (discussing limits on parents' control over a child's religious training gener-
ally). For more detailed discussions of the religion-and-custody issue, and of the
many cases in which it arises, see generally Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The
Use of Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FoPmuntsi L. REv.
383 (1989); Barbara Handschu & Mary Kay Kisthardt, Religion as a Custody Issue, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 21, 2000, at A17 (examining "parameters for consideration of religious fac-
tors in both custody and visitation disputes"); Rebecca Korzec, A Tale of Two Religions:
A Contractual Approach to Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Disputes, 25
NEW ENG. L. Rxv. 1121 (1991); Schneider, supra note 126, at 879, 879-906 (surveying
recent child custody decisions involving parents' religious disputes); Jennifer Ben-
ning, Note, A Guide for Lower Courts in Factoring Religion into Child Custody Disputes, 45
DRAKE L. REv. 733 (1997);Jennifer Ann Drobac, Note, For the Sake of the Children: Court
Consideration of Religion in Child Custody Cases, 50 STAN. L. Ruv. 1609 (1998) (including
survey of "over fifty state child custody cases since 1988"); Note, The Establishment
Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equa-
tion, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1702 (1984); Robyn E. Blumner, Custody Rulings on Religion
Flawed, CLVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 30, 1999, at IF.
141 That said, "[t]o balance the competing rights of parents and children" in cus-
tody cases, "many courts have adopted a 'harm' standard.... [This) allows a court to
examine parental religious practices in determining custody only if the practice
causes the child a threshold level of harm." Lauren D. Freeman, The Child's Best Inter-
ests vs. The Parent's Free Exercise of Religion, 32 CoLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 73, 78 (1998).
142 Beschle, supra note 140, at 400.
143 See Schneider, supra note 126, at 904 ("Courts have to make custody decisions,
and to make them as well as possible.... Courts must do what courts must do; they
should avoid doing what they can only do badly.").
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tion entitles them to do so (though it certainly protects their liberty in
a manner that enables parents, sometimes, to do badly by their chil-
dren), but only that we should resist the temptation to treat as harm-
ful the transmission of unpopular or illiberal religious beliefs. And I
agree, as I hope I have made clear, that children's best interests are, in
the end, the moral criteria for evaluating legal rules in this area. I am
claiming, though, that children's best interests, and freedom gener-
ally, are best served when the State's ability to second-guess parents'
decisions-especially in areas involving religion and education-is
carefully limited, as it was in Pierce, to prevent those who happen to
hold power and whose views happen to hold sway from imposing their
own orthodoxy on other people's children in the name of advancing
those children's best interests.144
Maybe traditional religious education, or a particular brand of
religion itself, really does harm children by undermining their future
capacities for choice, their future freedom and options and opportu-
nities in life, their future autonomy. Maybe these children are de-
prived of the required grounding in shared values and deliberative
skills and habits that being a good citizen in a liberal society requires.
But I doubt it. In any event, in the face of uncertainty, it seems to me
that we ought to require the Government to stay its hand and defer to
parents' incentives, obligations, and love when it comes to deciding
what children should learn, especially what they should learn, if any-
thing, about faith. And who knows? Perhaps constraining the State,
and clearing out space for families and for the "little platoons" of civil
society to do their work,145 would have the happy effect of encourag-
ing and nurturing the development of precisely those other-regarding
virtues that we are told liberal democracies cannot do without.
CONCLUSION: FA!iIEs, SuBsIDiARrry, AND SuBVERSIoN
There is no avoiding the fact that the Supreme Court's state-
ments, in Pierce and elsewhere, about parental control, and about par-
ents' rights to direct their children's upbringing and education, are
jarring to many modem ears. It is easy to hear in such statements
outdated and unappealing assertions of ownership and dominion over
children. But this is not how we should read Pierce today. We should
regard the case as a ringing endorsement of religious freedom and of
limited government dominion over citizens. The French Revolution-
144 See Goldstein, supra note 30, at 664 ("[A] prime function of law is to prevent
one person's truth ... from becoming another person's t)Tanny.").
145 See EDnwND BURKE, REFLEC IONS ON THE REvoLUTION IN FRu,%cE 41 (J.GA.
Pocock ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1987) (1790).
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aries asserted the "right" not to be free from any authority that did not
emanate from the State, 146 but we have learned to be wary of such
atomizing freedoms. In A ManforAll Seasons, Thomas More warns his
son-in-law Will Roper-who boasts that he would "cut down every law
in England" to "get after the Devil"-that "when the last law was down,
and the Devil turned round," few of us "could stand upright in the
winds that would blow."' 47 Substitute the liberal state for the Devil,
and mediating institutions, like the family, for the laws of England.
We can defend Pierce and at the same time recognize that parents
are blessed with the opportunity to raise, nurture, and educate their
children more than they are "entitled" to "control" them. Parents'
rights and obligations flow from their vocation, not from their store of
individual entitlements. 48 We are called to nurture, love, and edu-
cate children; we are not merely required or privileged by law to do
so. In so doing, we participate, in a sense, in the creation of a human
person whose dignity, I think we all agree, is inestimable.
I wonder, though, if Pierce is unavoidably anomalous in an intel-
lectual and legal culture that views families more as contractual ar-
rangements between autonomous individuals, or as dangerous
seedbeds of oppression, inequality, and patriarchy-as "school[s] of
despotism"' 49-instead of as the "first and vital cell[s] of society."'' °
Perhaps Pierce and the cluster of values and maxims for which it is
thought to stand are best defended not in terms of parents' individual
"rights" against government, and certainly not in terms of ownership
and property, but instead in terms of subsidiarity.15 1 Maybe we should
146 See DECLAMMATON OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN, art. 3 (Fr. 1789).
147 Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons (1960), reprinted in PLAY O OUa TIME 631,
669 (Bennet Cerf ed., 1967).
148 This notion of parenthood as "vocation" is emphasized in my own religious
tradition. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, LE-rxR TO FAMILIEs, at No. 16 (U.S. Catholic Con-
ference Pub'g Servs. 1994) ("Parents are the first and most important educators of their
own children, and they also possess a fundamental competence in this area: they are
educators because they are parents." (emphasis added)); POPEJOHN PAUL II, supra note 12,
at No. 36 ("The task of giving education is rooted in the primary vocation of married
couples to participate in God's creative activity. .. ").
149 John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women in A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF
WOMEN 217, 217 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., 1993).
150 POPEJOHN PAUL If, supra note 12, at No. 42 (quoting SECOND VATICAN ECUMEN.
ICAL COUNCIL, APOSTOLICAm ACTUOSITATEm [DECREE ON THE APOSTOLATE OF TIE LA.
rnI, at No. 11 (1965)); cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our
jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a
unit with broad parental authority over minor children." (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)).
151 Subsidiarity is, in twentieth-century Catholic social thought, the principle ac-
cording to which
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think of the family, as it appears in Pierce and in contemporary debates
about civic education, parental authority, and religious freedom, as
the original "mediating institution." On this view, the State properly
refrains from second-guessing families on matters of education and
the transmission of religious tradition not only out of respect for the
religious freedom and parental authority of the individuals situated
within those families, but also out of wise regard for those families'
integrity and health, precisely because the integrity and freedom of
these "vital cells" is important to the common good.
1 52
On the other hand, not only are families constitutive elements of
civil society, supporting the entirely legitimate "higher" associations,
including the State, they are also, and should be, subversive. Like the
Church, the family is an organic "community of persons"'5 3 and an
independent (from the State) source of meaning and %alue.r"' At
their best, families can provide, for their members, their neighbors,
and society, a prophetic counter-weight to the Statejust as, at its best,
religious faith challenges and subverts the State's claims to virtue and
competence. This is precisely why statists understandably seek to at-
omize the family and to minimize religion's influence through perse-
a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a
community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather
should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the
activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good.
U.S. CTHouc CoNrERNca, supra note 4, § 1883; see also Mary Ann Glendon, Civil
Servicte THE NEv REPUBLIc, Apr. 1, 1996, at 39, 40 (describing "subsidiarity" as "the
principle of leaving social tasks to the smallest social unit that can perform them ade-
quately"). "Subsidiarity" is also a more technical term in international and European
Community law. See generally George A. Bermann, Taldng Subsidiarily Seriously: Federal-
ism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUm. L RE%,. 331 (1994).
152 See, eg., Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo anno [On Reconstructing the Social Or-
der] 79, in CoNTr~r'oRAR' CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 47, 71 (National Conference
of Catholic Bishops ed., 1991) ("[I]t is an injustice and at the same time a grave eil
and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what
lesser and subordinate organizations can do.").
153 POPEJoHN PAUL II, supra note 12, at Nos. 18, 26; see also SECOD %,%TIrcN Ecu-
zs-nc.AL CouNciL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY [Dignitatis humanae], at No. 5,
in VATICAN CouNc. II 803 (Austin Flannery, O.P. ed., rev. ed. 1992) ("Every fam-
ily ... is a society with its om basic right.").
154 See Greene, supra note 75, at 406-07; see also Mard Hamilton, Power, TheF stab-
lishment Clause, and Voudiers, 31 CONN. L RE%'. 807,808 (1999) ("[IThe entire Consti-
tution is governed by the overarching principle that society is best served when
centers of power are kept separate.").
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cution, suppression, or co-option, 15 5 or perhaps through the milder
methods of civic education.
156
I have argued that Pierce points to ideals that should be taken seri-
ously, that do not conflict with personalist ideals regarding children's
dignity, and that are-especially in the context of education and relig-
ious training-worth defending vigorously. In Pierce, the integrity of
the family, the educational rights of parents, the limits on the State's
power to standardize thought, and the rightful demands of the com-
mon good are all grounded firmly, as child-centered liberals would
insist they must be, in the dignity of the human person. 157 Still, it
could be that defenses of Pierce that fail to move beyond parents'-
rights terms to discussions about the family as a society, and about its
supportive and subversive role in society, will not be able to respond as
powerfully as they must to the increasingly confident claims made for
government intervention in the name of civic education.
155 George Weigel provides a wonderful account of communist Poland's efforts in
this regard in his recent biography of PopeJohn Paul II. See GEORGE WEIGEL, WITNESS
TO HOPE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF POPE JOHN PAUL 11140-41, 300-25 (1999).
156 As Stephen Carter has observed, "[qluite simply, religion in its subversive
mode provides the believer with a transcendent reason to question the power of the
state. That is the reason that the state will always try to domesticate religion: to avoid
being subverted." Carter, supra note 57, at 1060; see also id. ("Often the willingness of
the religious to be subversive in the face of official and unofficial pressures has made
the nation better.").
157 See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 3, at 177 ("There are widely shared moral beliefs
and legal rules about how we should treat people simply by virtue of their
personhood.").
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